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 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ







This	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠexamines	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1947	 ﾠConstitution	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan,	 ﾠ
showing	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1889.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠexamines	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
religion	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAllied	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠ(1945-ﾭ‐1952),	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Shinto,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠimplementation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1947	 ﾠconstitution.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠ
documents	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠdrafted	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠnew	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
religion,	 ﾠdisplacing	 ﾠa	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠcommission	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwas	 ﾠworking	 ﾠto	 ﾠrevise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Meiji	 ﾠconstitution.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠin	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐Occupation	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
constitutional	 ﾠrevision,	 ﾠissues	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcontroversial,	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠ
proposals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠrevised	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠwould	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠchanges.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Introduction	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠConstitution	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠ(Nihon	 ﾠkoku	 ﾠkenpō)	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdrafted	 ﾠunder	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠ
occupation	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1946	 ﾠand	 ﾠpromulgated	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1947;	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠas	 ﾠ‘the	 ﾠpostwar	 ﾠ
constitution’.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠis	 ﾠformally	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠrevised	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1889	 ﾠ
Constitution	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEmpire	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠ(Dai	 ﾠNihon	 ﾠTeikoku	 ﾠKenpō,	 ﾠhereinafter,	 ﾠ‘the	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠ
constitution’,	 ﾠso	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠissued	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠ1868-ﾭ‐1912).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠand	 ﾠorientation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠconstitutions	 ﾠare	 ﾠso	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
practical	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠit	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠsense	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠseparate.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreligion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠin	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ28:	 ﾠ“Japanese	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠshall,	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠlimits	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprejudicial	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠduties	 ﾠas	 ﾠsubjects,	 ﾠenjoy	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠbelief.”	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠlimited,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtrumped	 ﾠby	 ﾠother	 ﾠ“duties,”	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspecified.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠon	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠconstitutions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlate	 ﾠnineteenth	 ﾠ
century	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrestriction	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠfreedom.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Meiji	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
postwar	 ﾠconstitution’s	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠare	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠdifferent:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ20:	 ﾠFreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠ(shinkyō	 ﾠno	 ﾠjiyū)	 ﾠis	 ﾠguaranteed	 ﾠto	 ﾠall.	 ﾠNo	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠ
organization	 ﾠshall	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠany	 ﾠprivileges	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠany	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
authority.	 ﾠNo	 ﾠperson	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠpart	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠact,	 ﾠcelebration,	 ﾠ
rite,	 ﾠor	 ﾠpractice.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠState	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠorgans	 ﾠshall	 ﾠrefrain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠother	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ89:	 ﾠNo	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpended	 ﾠor	 ﾠappropriated	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠuse,	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠor	 ﾠmaintenance	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠor	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠor	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
charitable,	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠor	 ﾠbenevolent	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠpubic	 ﾠ
authority.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ89	 ﾠserves	 ﾠto	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ(article	 ﾠ20)	 ﾠby	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠ
forbidding	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠexpenditures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠorganizations,	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠschools,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcharities.	 ﾠ
Related	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠmain	 ﾠarticles,	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ14	 ﾠforbids	 ﾠ“discrimination	 ﾠin	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠeconomic,	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠ…creed,”	 ﾠand	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ19	 ﾠprohibits	 ﾠany	 ﾠviolation	 ﾠof	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
thought	 ﾠor	 ﾠconscience.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠthese	 ﾠclauses	 ﾠmake	 ﾠclear,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpostwar	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠupholds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
principles	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠrestriction	 ﾠand	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠstate	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfund	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠactivities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Meiji	 ﾠconstitution,	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠalso	 ﾠgoverned	 ﾠreligion.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ1880s	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠhad	 ﾠpublicly	 ﾠmaintained	 ﾠthat	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
religion.	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbureaucracy	 ﾠin	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠaffairs	 ﾠpromoted	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
expression	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠethnic	 ﾠidentity	 ﾠand	 ﾠloyalty	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthrone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠobserve,	 ﾠregardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠassertion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠ
belongs	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠrealm	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠit	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠand	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
idea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠelement	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrites	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
embodies	 ﾠJapan’s	 ﾠindigenous	 ﾠtradition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠbureaucracy	 ﾠpromoted	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠancient	 ﾠrites	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
performed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠan	 ﾠannual	 ﾠcalendar	 ﾠof	 ﾠpalace	 ﾠritual	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
enthronement	 ﾠrites.	 ﾠEarly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠhad	 ﾠlegitimated	 ﾠitself	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
making	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠits	 ﾠchief	 ﾠsymbol.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdistinguished	 ﾠitself	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
predecessor,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTokugawa	 ﾠshogunate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhad	 ﾠruled	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1600	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1868,	 ﾠby	 ﾠrejecting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
shogunate’s	 ﾠpromotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠBuddhism.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠpromoted	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠdraconian	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠexcise	 ﾠall	 ﾠBuddhist	 ﾠritual	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
shrines	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpalace,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠrevive	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠancient	 ﾠannual	 ﾠcalendar	 ﾠof	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠritual	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠKami,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeities	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠ80,000	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
organized	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠunified	 ﾠranking	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstructed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbureaucracy	 ﾠto	 ﾠstage	 ﾠritual	 ﾠ
mirroring	 ﾠthose	 ﾠperformed	 ﾠby	 ﾠor	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠa	 ﾠritual	 ﾠ
system	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠunify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠnation	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠspirit	 ﾠof	 ﾠreverent	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠhis	 ﾠgovernment.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠunification	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠunder	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠadministration,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
common	 ﾠranking	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠBuddhism,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠ
patriotism,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠritual	 ﾠcalendar	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwere	 ﾠrevolutionary	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto,	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠwatersheds	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapan.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Seen	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlight,	 ﾠState	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠwas	 ﾠan	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠnovel	 ﾠcreation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Occupation,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠhad	 ﾠmisused	 ﾠor	 ﾠtwisted	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠends	 ﾠhad	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
truth	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠand	 ﾠroles	 ﾠin	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
performance	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠritual,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠuniquely	 ﾠembodies	 ﾠindigenous	 ﾠ
tradition,	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmade	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“religion”	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠelement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnovel	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlate	 ﾠnineteenth	 ﾠ
century,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfree	 ﾠto	 ﾠreject.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠaffirmation	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpriesthood	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐religious	 ﾠ
phenomenon	 ﾠcaused	 ﾠa	 ﾠbitter	 ﾠcontroversy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacademy.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlate	 ﾠnineteenth	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
twentieth	 ﾠcenturies,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopulace’s	 ﾠdevotional	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdivinities	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Shinto,	 ﾠknown	 ﾠas	 ﾠKami,	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠprayers,	 ﾠceremonies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfestivals	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠshrines,	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠacknowledged	 ﾠamong	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreligious,	 ﾠby	 ﾠany	 ﾠdefinition,	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
priesthood	 ﾠmight	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠits	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠritual.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠ
outside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠpriesthood,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfiction	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto’s	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐religious	 ﾠnature	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
formulated	 ﾠby	 ﾠbureaucrats	 ﾠintent	 ﾠupon	 ﾠlifting	 ﾠShinto’s	 ﾠstate	 ﾠrites	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnation	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontentious	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠteachings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Western	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠin	 ﾠprewar	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠDaniel	 ﾠHoltom	 ﾠ
(1884-ﾭ‐1962)1	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwas	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAllied	 ﾠ
Occupation.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ1943	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠModern	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠand	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠNationalism:	 ﾠA	 ﾠStudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠPresent-ﾭ‐
Day	 ﾠTrends	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠReligions,2	 ﾠHoltom	 ﾠasserted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠpromotes	 ﾠnationalism	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
militarism.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠbureaucrats’	 ﾠfondest	 ﾠhope	 ﾠfor	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
promote	 ﾠpatriotic	 ﾠloyalty,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsurprising	 ﾠthat	 ﾠHoltom	 ﾠcame	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconclusion.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
right,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠconcentration	 ﾠon	 ﾠShinto,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠwork	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequally	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
fact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠbranches	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠand	 ﾠcompeted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠso.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠpriesthood	 ﾠflourished	 ﾠunder	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠpatronage,	 ﾠand	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠrites	 ﾠ
became	 ﾠa	 ﾠstaple	 ﾠobservance	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠ1868	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAllied	 ﾠ
Occupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠcommenced	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1945,	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠgrew	 ﾠand	 ﾠprospered	 ﾠunder	 ﾠbureaucratic	 ﾠ
supervision	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠentity	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠrightful	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠas	 ﾠembodying	 ﾠindigenous	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠtradition.	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthis	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠwas	 ﾠso	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠ
allied	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“State	 ﾠShinto.”	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠflourished	 ﾠduring	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠera,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpriesthood	 ﾠbitterly	 ﾠresented	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation’s	 ﾠrelegation	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
private	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠejection	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠafter.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠ
priestly	 ﾠbody,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNational	 ﾠAssociation	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠShrines	 ﾠ(founded	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1945),	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
variety	 ﾠof	 ﾠways	 ﾠeven	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecover	 ﾠShinto’s	 ﾠlost	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠroles.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Occupation	 ﾠPolicies	 ﾠRegarding	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠ
Planning	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbegun	 ﾠin	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1943,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠState	 ﾠ
Department	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠto	 ﾠplan	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐surrender	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠbody	 ﾠworked	 ﾠintensively,	 ﾠmeeting	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠ200	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠby	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1945.3	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠPotsdam	 ﾠDeclaration	 ﾠof	 ﾠ26	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ1945	 ﾠdictated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠJapan’s	 ﾠunconditional	 ﾠsurrender	 ﾠand	 ﾠannounced	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
established.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurrender,	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠleaders	 ﾠwere	 ﾠextremely	 ﾠfearful	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation’s	 ﾠ
intentions	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠShinto.	 ﾠMany	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠabolish	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠ
completely.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠone	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠaccount,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠrumored	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
shrine	 ﾠpriests	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexecuted	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠclose	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary.4	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠOccupation’s	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠon	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠwere	 ﾠspecified	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠ
Commander,	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠDouglas	 ﾠMacArthur,	 ﾠon	 ﾠ21	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1945	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠ“U.S.	 ﾠ
Initial	 ﾠPost-ﾭ‐Surrender	 ﾠPolicy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠJapan,”	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠstated,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
“Freedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠworship	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠproclaimed	 ﾠpromptly	 ﾠon	 ﾠOccupation.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠplain	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠthat	 ﾠultranationalistic	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
militaristic	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠand	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpermitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠhide	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
cloak	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion,”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠfurther,	 ﾠ“You	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠGovernment	 ﾠto	 ﾠcease	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠaid	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠof	 ﾠNational	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠestablishments.”	 ﾠ
From	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1945,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠpersonnel	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠsolely	 ﾠwith	 ﾠShinto.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠset	 ﾠup	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
Civil	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠand	 ﾠEducation	 ﾠSection	 ﾠ(CIE)	 ﾠon	 ﾠ22	 ﾠSeptember	 ﾠ1945,	 ﾠheaded	 ﾠby	 ﾠColonel	 ﾠ
(later,	 ﾠBrigadier	 ﾠGeneral)	 ﾠKen	 ﾠR.	 ﾠDyke,	 ﾠsubsequently	 ﾠestablishing	 ﾠDivisions	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
relating	 ﾠto	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠand	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠReligions	 ﾠDivision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠheaded	 ﾠby	 ﾠLieutenant	 ﾠ
William	 ﾠKenneth	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠ(1907-ﾭ‐2008).	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠ
representatives	 ﾠmost	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠinteracted.5	 ﾠAnother	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠReligions	 ﾠ
Division	 ﾠwas	 ﾠWilliam	 ﾠP.	 ﾠWoodward,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠserved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ1946	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Occupation.6	 ﾠ
Drafting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPostwar	 ﾠConstitution	 ﾠBegins	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation’s	 ﾠReligions	 ﾠDivision	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
interact	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠprojects	 ﾠaiming	 ﾠto	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠconstitution.	 ﾠConstitutional	 ﾠdrafting	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠaffairs	 ﾠproceeded	 ﾠon	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠtracks.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠ
Commander	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAllied	 ﾠForces,	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠDouglas	 ﾠMacArthur,	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠapproached	 ﾠPrince	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
Konoe	 ﾠFumimaro	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠdrafting	 ﾠin	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1945,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠKonoe	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠsuicide	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠface	 ﾠcharges	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwar	 ﾠcriminal.7	 ﾠAround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠMacArthur	 ﾠapproached	 ﾠKonoe,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠappointed	 ﾠscholar	 ﾠ
Matsumoto	 ﾠJōji,	 ﾠa	 ﾠscholar	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠto	 ﾠhead	 ﾠa	 ﾠbody	 ﾠtitled,	 ﾠ“Constitutional	 ﾠIssue	 ﾠ
Investigation	 ﾠCommittee.”	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtitle	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠincorporate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠword	 ﾠ“revision,”	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
government’s	 ﾠhope	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠto	 ﾠissue	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠmore	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠguidelines	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
interpreting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠtampering	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective	 ﾠ
Meanwhile,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠReligions	 ﾠDivision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠworking	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation’s	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠconsequential	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠin	 ﾠreligion,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
superseded	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitution,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠand	 ﾠstate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Directive	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠset	 ﾠin	 ﾠstone	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠby	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠ
constitutional	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠin	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐Occupation	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠcases	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠ
religion).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠfully	 ﾠgrasp	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitution’s	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurpose,	 ﾠsubstance,	 ﾠand	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠState	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠsent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“Memorandum:	 ﾠ
Freedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠWorship”	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠCommander	 ﾠin	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠ1945.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠprompt	 ﾠ
declaration	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠbut	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠShinto,	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferentiating	 ﾠShintoism,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreligion,	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠextreme	 ﾠNationalism.”8	 ﾠPre-ﾭ‐surrender	 ﾠplanners	 ﾠintended	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
permitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinue,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠno	 ﾠplans	 ﾠto	 ﾠabolish	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠ80,000	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ
shrines,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠYasukuni	 ﾠShrine,	 ﾠnational	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar	 ﾠdead.9	 ﾠIn	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Occupation	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdestroy	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠclose	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠshrine.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Meanwhile,	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbegun	 ﾠintensive	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠprepare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
directive.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠdrew	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworks	 ﾠof	 ﾠDaniel	 ﾠHoltom,10	 ﾠalso	 ﾠconsulting	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
Tokyo	 ﾠImperial	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠprofessor	 ﾠof	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠAnesaki	 ﾠMasaharu.	 ﾠDuring	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠpreparing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective,	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmost	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠKishimoto	 ﾠHideo	 ﾠ(1903-ﾭ‐1964),	 ﾠson-ﾭ‐in-ﾭ‐law	 ﾠand	 ﾠformer	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠof	 ﾠAnesaki,	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠan	 ﾠassistant	 ﾠprofessor	 ﾠat	 ﾠTokyo	 ﾠImperial	 ﾠUniversity.	 ﾠKishimoto,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhad	 ﾠspent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
years	 ﾠ1930	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1934	 ﾠat	 ﾠHarvard,	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdrafted	 ﾠto	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠCIE’s	 ﾠcommunications	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
Japanese	 ﾠexperts,	 ﾠscholars,	 ﾠand	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠoffices	 ﾠrelating	 ﾠto	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠand	 ﾠreligion.11	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ On	 ﾠsome	 ﾠten	 ﾠoccasions,	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠhad	 ﾠKishimoto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠpresentations	 ﾠon	 ﾠShinto,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ
Bunce	 ﾠput	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠto	 ﾠhim.	 ﾠKishimoto	 ﾠalso	 ﾠarranged	 ﾠvisits	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠand	 ﾠDyke	 ﾠto	 ﾠvisit	 ﾠ
various	 ﾠsites	 ﾠto	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠlife	 ﾠin	 ﾠsitu.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠKishimoto	 ﾠproved	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
questions,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlocate	 ﾠan	 ﾠexpert	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcould	 ﾠrespond.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠclear	 ﾠto	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠsessions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide-ﾭ‐ranging,	 ﾠpolymorphous	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
comprehended	 ﾠsolely	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠslogans	 ﾠlike	 ﾠmilitarism	 ﾠand	 ﾠnationalism.12	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠYasukuni	 ﾠShrine	 ﾠremained	 ﾠdistinctly	 ﾠproblematic,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠwas	 ﾠan	 ﾠelement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfavored	 ﾠclosing	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠSpecial	 ﾠEnshrinement	 ﾠ
Service	 ﾠwas	 ﾠplanned	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ20	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1945,	 ﾠto	 ﾠapotheosize	 ﾠaround	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠwar	 ﾠdead.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠarose	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠshould	 ﾠcancel	 ﾠit,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠscale	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠevent	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprospect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠattending.	 ﾠDyke	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠto	 ﾠattend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ceremony	 ﾠwith	 ﾠBunce,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠYasukuni	 ﾠpromoted	 ﾠmilitarism.	 ﾠKishimoto	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarrangements,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠnegotiations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠand	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
officers,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwere	 ﾠplanning	 ﾠto	 ﾠappear	 ﾠin	 ﾠfull	 ﾠuniform,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdemobilization.	 ﾠ
Kishimoto	 ﾠwas	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠpersuade	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠeliminate	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠelements	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠpomp,	 ﾠ
based	 ﾠon	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠDyke	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwell	 ﾠmake	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠon	 ﾠYasukuni’s	 ﾠfuture,	 ﾠbased	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhappen	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠceremony.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend,	 ﾠDyke	 ﾠand	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠattended	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ceremony,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhad	 ﾠlunch	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHead	 ﾠPriest.13	 ﾠThey	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthe	 ﾠceremony	 ﾠ
unproblematic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Wartime	 ﾠpropaganda	 ﾠhad	 ﾠdoubtless	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠDyke	 ﾠand	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbe	 ﾠequated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmilitarism	 ﾠand	 ﾠnationalism.	 ﾠThrough	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinvestigations,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠKishimoto’s	 ﾠtutelage	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠother	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠscholars,	 ﾠ
complemented	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠlife	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠshrines,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
occupiers’	 ﾠviews	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠmore	 ﾠnuanced	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsophisticated.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
interaction	 ﾠamong	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠofficials,	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠscholars,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠleaders	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
always	 ﾠeasy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠits	 ﾠresults	 ﾠwere	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠpositive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ It	 ﾠbears	 ﾠnoting,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠreached	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Religions	 ﾠDivision	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlate	 ﾠOctober	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ1945	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
inevitably	 ﾠlopsided	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠcame	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilitarism	 ﾠor	 ﾠnationalism	 ﾠand	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠ
religions.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠReligions	 ﾠDivision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠso	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠso	 ﾠintent	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
clarifying	 ﾠShinto’s	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠto	 ﾠmilitarism	 ﾠand	 ﾠnationalism,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
unlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠrealize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠvirtually	 ﾠall	 ﾠother	 ﾠbranches	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1945	 ﾠhad	 ﾠ
similarly	 ﾠdevoted	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠto	 ﾠprayers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠvictory,	 ﾠexaltation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmartial	 ﾠspirit,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan’s	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠmission	 ﾠto	 ﾠrule	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠAsia.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠsingle-ﾭ‐
minded	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠweeks	 ﾠinevitably	 ﾠunderlined	 ﾠShinto’s	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠmilitarism	 ﾠand	 ﾠnationalism	 ﾠand	 ﾠequally	 ﾠinevitably	 ﾠobscured	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsame	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠin	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠbranches	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠWoodward’s	 ﾠwords	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠ“Shinto	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
whipping	 ﾠboy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation.”14	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Moreover,	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠwas	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠsample	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinvestigations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdrafting.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgreatest	 ﾠreason	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠof	 ﾠpress	 ﾠcensorship,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠforbade	 ﾠany	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
newspapers	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠvirtually	 ﾠno	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠalong	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
research.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠpress	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠwas	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠdevoted	 ﾠto	 ﾠviews	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠseen	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠpapers.	 ﾠA	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠpiece	 ﾠappearing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAsahi	 ﾠon	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ12,	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Takashima	 ﾠBeihō,	 ﾠa	 ﾠBuddhist	 ﾠleader	 ﾠknown	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreformer,	 ﾠchampioned	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠreligion.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠundoubtedly	 ﾠwas	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarticle,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠalready	 ﾠ
rejected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthor’s	 ﾠposition.15	 ﾠ
Whenever	 ﾠa	 ﾠdirective	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠissued,	 ﾠa	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcomposed,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠwould	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠits	 ﾠnecessity	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChief	 ﾠof	 ﾠStaff.	 ﾠStaff	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠ
whatever	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirective	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠ
Commander,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠto	 ﾠimplement	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdirective.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠaccompanying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective,	 ﾠdated	 ﾠ3	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1945,16	 ﾠ
explains,	 ﾠ“State	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠmilitarists	 ﾠand	 ﾠultranationalists	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
engender	 ﾠand	 ﾠfoster	 ﾠa	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠspirit	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠa	 ﾠwar	 ﾠof	 ﾠexpansion.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠnoting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefeat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠundermined	 ﾠShinto’s	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠpotential,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
report	 ﾠcontinues,	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠwill	 ﾠremain	 ﾠa	 ﾠdanger	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠseparated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠeliminated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschools.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠgovernment’s	 ﾠmisuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠconsisted	 ﾠof	 ﾠinserting	 ﾠit	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschools:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
“Through	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmedium	 ﾠof	 ﾠtextbooks,	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠindoctrinated	 ﾠteachers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠ
impressive	 ﾠceremonies,	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠinstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinculcating	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
submissiveness,	 ﾠloyalty	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠand	 ﾠunquestioning	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠ
views….Good	 ﾠcitizenship	 ﾠwas	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠwith	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠmythology.”17	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠreport	 ﾠstates	 ﾠconclusively	 ﾠthat	 ﾠState	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreligion.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠit	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠdoctrines,	 ﾠit	 ﾠstood	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuperiority	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Japanese,	 ﾠworship	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving	 ﾠgod,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠmission	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
rule	 ﾠAsia.18	 ﾠState	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠdangerous,	 ﾠinasmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠstood	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrevived	 ﾠand	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠto	 ﾠinstill	 ﾠsentiments	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
militarism	 ﾠand	 ﾠimperialism.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeliminated,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠif	 ﾠState	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
removed	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschools	 ﾠand	 ﾠstrictly	 ﾠseparated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠSignificantly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreport	 ﾠ
foresaw	 ﾠno	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠ
house.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠreport	 ﾠconcluded	 ﾠwith	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsevering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeliminating	 ﾠit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschools:	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠ
severing	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsupport;	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreligion;	 ﾠelimination	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠor	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshrines,	 ﾠplacing	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠequal	 ﾠfooting	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠreligions;	 ﾠelimination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShrine	 ﾠInstitute	 ﾠ(Jingiin),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbureaucratic	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ1940	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠaffairs;	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠelements	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠschools,	 ﾠ
including	 ﾠnationalist	 ﾠinterpretations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠImperial	 ﾠRescript	 ﾠon	 ﾠEducation;	 ﾠremoval	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Shinto	 ﾠaltars	 ﾠ(kamidana)	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠschools	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠoffices;	 ﾠ	 ﾠand	 ﾠabolition	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompulsory	 ﾠ
school	 ﾠtrips	 ﾠto	 ﾠshrines.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreport	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠrecommended	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠissue	 ﾠa	 ﾠrescript	 ﾠ
repudiating	 ﾠall	 ﾠnotions	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠsuperiority	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmission	 ﾠto	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠAsia.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠdirective	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠcease	 ﾠimmediately:	 ﾠall	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠShinto,	 ﾠall	 ﾠpropagation	 ﾠand	 ﾠdissemination	 ﾠof	 ﾠmilitaristic	 ﾠideology	 ﾠin	 ﾠShinto—and	 ﾠall	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
religions’—doctrines,	 ﾠpractices,	 ﾠrites,	 ﾠand	 ﾠceremonies,	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ
devoted	 ﾠto	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠpriests’	 ﾠtraining,	 ﾠand	 ﾠany	 ﾠdissemination	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠdoctrines	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠschools.	 ﾠCirculation	 ﾠof	 ﾠnationalistic	 ﾠtracts	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠKokutai	 ﾠno	 ﾠhongi)	 ﾠwas	 ﾠordered	 ﾠ
stopped,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠterms	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“Greater	 ﾠEast	 ﾠAsia	 ﾠWar”	 ﾠ(dai	 ﾠtōa	 ﾠsensō)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠ
Whole	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠOne	 ﾠRoof”	 ﾠ(hakkō	 ﾠichiū)	 ﾠwere	 ﾠprohibited.	 ﾠ	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠaltars	 ﾠ(kamidana)	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠother	 ﾠritual	 ﾠgear	 ﾠwere	 ﾠordered	 ﾠremoved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠbuildings	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠkinds,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠ
schools.	 ﾠNo	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdiscriminated	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠrefusal	 ﾠto	 ﾠprofess	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Shinto	 ﾠor	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠrefusal	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠceremony.	 ﾠPublic	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠwere	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
cease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠof	 ﾠvisiting	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠto	 ﾠreport	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠoffice.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠput	 ﾠ“upon	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠentitled	 ﾠto	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
protection.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠdirective	 ﾠrepeatedly	 ﾠforbade	 ﾠ“militaristic	 ﾠand	 ﾠultra-ﾭ‐nationalist	 ﾠideology,”	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠas	 ﾠdoctrines	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuperiority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠpeople,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Japanese	 ﾠislands,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠany	 ﾠdoctrine	 ﾠ“which	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠdelude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
embarking	 ﾠupon	 ﾠwars	 ﾠof	 ﾠaggression	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠglorify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠwar	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
settlement	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠwith	 ﾠother	 ﾠpeoples.”19	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ While	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirective	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠknown	 ﾠinformally	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠexclusively	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
Shinto,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwent	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdistance	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠa	 ﾠwider	 ﾠdeclaration	 ﾠof	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
state,	 ﾠinasmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠall	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠ(Shinto	 ﾠincluded)	 ﾠwere	 ﾠprohibited	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ“affiliation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
government.”	 ﾠIt	 ﾠthus	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwent	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠBunce’s	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠ
regarding	 ﾠShinto.20	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠswiftly	 ﾠto	 ﾠcomply	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective,	 ﾠ
issuing	 ﾠorders	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠdays	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprefectures	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuspend	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprohibited	 ﾠpractices.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
Ministry	 ﾠof	 ﾠEducation	 ﾠremoved	 ﾠkamidana	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschools	 ﾠand	 ﾠreferences	 ﾠto	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠtextbooks.	 ﾠEthics	 ﾠcourses	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsuspended.21	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTokyo	 ﾠImperial	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠChair	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Shinto	 ﾠwas	 ﾠabolished.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠ15	 ﾠMarch	 ﾠ1946,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠreported	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
appropriate	 ﾠconsultations	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠheld,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠ
removed	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbudget.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠwas	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsatisfied	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠ
government’s	 ﾠcompliance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnamed	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagents	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠShinto’s	 ﾠmisuse,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠnaming	 ﾠnames	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠa	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠministry.	 ﾠNeither	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpriesthood	 ﾠnor	 ﾠ
Shinto	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsingled	 ﾠout	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpunishment,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠsome	 ﾠwere	 ﾠbriefly	 ﾠ“purged,”	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefrain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠNo	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
blame	 ﾠwas	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmisuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirective	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ1945.	 ﾠ
Both	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpreceded	 ﾠit	 ﾠtacitly	 ﾠabsolved	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Shinto	 ﾠworld	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠ“misuse”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“perversion”	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠroles	 ﾠin	 ﾠShinto’s	 ﾠtransformation?	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
directive	 ﾠtreated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠas	 ﾠvirtually	 ﾠpassive	 ﾠonlookers	 ﾠor	 ﾠvictims,	 ﾠas	 ﾠlacking	 ﾠagency	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
change	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠevents.	 ﾠNo	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠperson	 ﾠseemed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear	 ﾠany	 ﾠresponsibility.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
fuzzy	 ﾠimage	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠseized	 ﾠupon	 ﾠby	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠand	 ﾠmolded	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠends,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠagency	 ﾠattributed	 ﾠto	 ﾠanybody	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbureaucracy,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpriesthood,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople,	 ﾠ
became	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠnarrative	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto’s	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠhistory.	 ﾠState	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
apparently	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“just	 ﾠhappened”	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpriests	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople.	 ﾠ
How	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠsociety?	 ﾠNewspaper	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠminimal	 ﾠand	 ﾠshowed	 ﾠmost	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
forced	 ﾠto	 ﾠabdicate	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠeliminated	 ﾠaltogether.	 ﾠCertainly	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
protests,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirective	 ﾠwas	 ﾠissued	 ﾠa	 ﾠmere	 ﾠfour	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurrender,	 ﾠ
concerns	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsurviving	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠone	 ﾠday	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠwere	 ﾠstill	 ﾠuppermost	 ﾠin	 ﾠeveryone’s	 ﾠ
mind.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠcensorship	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠhad	 ﾠviolently	 ﾠ
disapproved	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective,	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠwas	 ﾠunlikely.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDiet,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠ1949,	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠlegislators	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfind	 ﾠit	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠproblematic.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠearly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Occupation,	 ﾠDiet	 ﾠmembers’	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠon	 ﾠanything	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠwas	 ﾠremarkably	 ﾠ
circumspect	 ﾠand	 ﾠbrief.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠDiet	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
censorship	 ﾠ(meaning	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsubmission	 ﾠof	 ﾠremarks	 ﾠto	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠin	 ﾠadvance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠapproval	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrequired),	 ﾠa	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐censorship	 ﾠwas	 ﾠpracticed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠYomiuri	 ﾠnewspaper	 ﾠused	 ﾠits	 ﾠ18	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1945	 ﾠeditorial	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeclare	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Shinto	 ﾠDirective	 ﾠremoved	 ﾠ“a	 ﾠveil	 ﾠof	 ﾠmystery”	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠShinto,	 ﾠshedding	 ﾠnew	 ﾠlight	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠJapan’s	 ﾠdeplorable	 ﾠcondition.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠthose	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeducated	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdoubted	 ﾠShinto’s	 ﾠ“mysticism”	 ﾠ(shinpisei),	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠhad	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“power”	 ﾠ(chikara)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
challenge	 ﾠit,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠto	 ﾠsocialists	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠunions.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpassivity	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
bureaucrats	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠto	 ﾠtwist	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠphilosophy	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan’s	 ﾠmission	 ﾠfor	 ﾠworld	 ﾠ
domination,	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠwar	 ﾠand	 ﾠutter	 ﾠdefeat.	 ﾠNow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠveil	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠlifted,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠshould	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthis	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠoccasion	 ﾠto	 ﾠrebuild	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“reform	 ﾠits	 ﾠhistory,”	 ﾠ
beginning	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠhas	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠas	 ﾠits	 ﾠhead	 ﾠ
priest.22	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠeditorial	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠit	 ﾠappears	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“veil	 ﾠof	 ﾠmystery”	 ﾠcame	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠnowhere	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠdescended	 ﾠon	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmade	 ﾠit	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠNo	 ﾠone	 ﾠwas	 ﾠat	 ﾠfault.	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The	 ﾠnewspaper	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠraise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠbore	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
responsibility.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠwas	 ﾠequally	 ﾠa	 ﾠvictim,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠno	 ﾠperpetrators.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Reception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠpriesthood	 ﾠwas	 ﾠoverwhelmingly	 ﾠ
negative,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠremains	 ﾠa	 ﾠstaple	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠscholarship	 ﾠeven	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
beginning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwenty-ﾭ‐first	 ﾠcentury.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠpreceded	 ﾠit	 ﾠtacitly	 ﾠabsolved	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠworld	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠ“misuse”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
“perversion”	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠabsolution	 ﾠleft	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
clear	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpriesthood	 ﾠhad	 ﾠeither	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠincapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠdefending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠcomplicit	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠmisuse.	 ﾠJinja	 ﾠshinpō,	 ﾠnewspaper	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAssociation	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠShrines,	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠnow	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠcritique	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDirective	 ﾠfor	 ﾠimpugning	 ﾠShinto’s	 ﾠhonor	 ﾠand	 ﾠfailing	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
understand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠwas	 ﾠitself	 ﾠvictimized	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠappropriation	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Implementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠrevealed	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
attitudes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirective	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠeradicate	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠrooted	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠchanged,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠquickly	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠassist	 ﾠthem	 ﾠin	 ﾠrejecting	 ﾠ
ongoing	 ﾠcoercion	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠmonetarily.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcomplaints	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠviolations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDirective.23	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcomplaints	 ﾠtook	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠforms.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠstate	 ﾠbroadcasting	 ﾠcompany	 ﾠ
(Nihon	 ﾠHōsō	 ﾠKyōkai)	 ﾠaired	 ﾠone	 ﾠwoman’s	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠprogram	 ﾠexamining	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
August	 ﾠ1946:	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠfestival…last	 ﾠmonth	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠusual.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠday	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfestival,	 ﾠ
several	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneighborhood	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠto	 ﾠclean	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsacred	 ﾠpalanquin,	 ﾠto	 ﾠweed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprecincts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠhaul	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠbig	 ﾠcart.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmen	 ﾠsat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdrinking	 ﾠtea,	 ﾠ
smoking,	 ﾠcounting	 ﾠtalismans,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠcut	 ﾠpapers	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhung	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshrine.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠancient	 ﾠcustom	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvillage	 ﾠand	 ﾠno	 ﾠone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠprotest.	 ﾠ
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This	 ﾠyear	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmorning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠday	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfestival,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcircular	 ﾠwritten	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠsheets	 ﾠof	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠcame	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠhouse.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnames	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheads	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
families	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvillage	 ﾠand	 ﾠgave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsibilities	 ﾠassigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠeach…But	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠangry,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠleft	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlaugh.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠ
freedom	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubmit	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpressure.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
afternoon	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfestival	 ﾠday	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhead	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠformer	 ﾠhead	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
neighborhood	 ﾠassociation)	 ﾠcame	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠand	 ﾠsaid,	 ﾠ“I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠcollect	 ﾠyour	 ﾠ
contribution	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfestival.	 ﾠThough	 ﾠyou	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthree	 ﾠfamilies	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠnone	 ﾠis	 ﾠhelping	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
festival,	 ﾠso	 ﾠyou	 ﾠshould	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠ300	 ﾠyen….”	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠasked,	 ﾠ“Why	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontribution?”	 ﾠhe	 ﾠanswered:	 ﾠ“To	 ﾠrepair	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshrine.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
large	 ﾠsum	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoney….”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠthe	 ﾠso-ﾭ‐called	 ﾠmanagers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfestival	 ﾠdrink	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlate	 ﾠat	 ﾠnight	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
bother	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneighbors,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠwaiting	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsix	 ﾠyears	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠhusband’s	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠabroad.	 ﾠ[Presumably	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠheld	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUSSR].	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠinvalid	 ﾠold	 ﾠ
father	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrother	 ﾠon	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠrelief.	 ﾠStill	 ﾠworse,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠelder	 ﾠsister,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠwar	 ﾠ
widow,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠjoined	 ﾠmy	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠwith	 ﾠher	 ﾠchildren.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠlead	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
meager	 ﾠlife	 ﾠby	 ﾠsewing	 ﾠand	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠbags.	 ﾠHow	 ﾠcan	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠ300	 ﾠyen?”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠserious	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘woman’s	 ﾠhousehold’	 ﾠlike	 ﾠours,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
anxious	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠrations	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwere	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠissued	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
next	 ﾠday.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthought	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠold	 ﾠfather	 ﾠand	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠelder	 ﾠsister	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠher	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontribution.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠI	 ﾠhad	 ﾠno	 ﾠmoney,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠelse	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠso	 ﾠI	 ﾠwent	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoney-ﾭ‐lender.24	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwoman’s	 ﾠcomplaint	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠclear,	 ﾠrelatives	 ﾠdisplaced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠwar	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
bombing	 ﾠcampaigns	 ﾠpiled	 ﾠin	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠto	 ﾠsomehow	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠliving,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠlean.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspeaker’s	 ﾠfather,	 ﾠbrother,	 ﾠsister	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsister’s	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠwere	 ﾠliving	 ﾠwith	 ﾠher	 ﾠled	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠneighborhood	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠher	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthree	 ﾠfamilies’	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshrine.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
further	 ﾠgalling	 ﾠto	 ﾠher	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠout	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
backbreaking	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠweeding	 ﾠand	 ﾠhauling	 ﾠfuel,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmen	 ﾠspent	 ﾠa	 ﾠleisurely	 ﾠday	 ﾠfolding	 ﾠ
paper	 ﾠand	 ﾠdrinking	 ﾠtea,	 ﾠfollowed	 ﾠby	 ﾠnighttime	 ﾠcarousing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdisturbed	 ﾠeveryone	 ﾠelse.	 ﾠ
Pressured	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠhead	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneighborhood	 ﾠassociation,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠshe	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequested	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠloan	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠit.	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠdid	 ﾠshe	 ﾠ
go	 ﾠalong,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠcould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠrefused?	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠshe	 ﾠmentions	 ﾠin	 ﾠclosest	 ﾠproximity	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
decision	 ﾠis	 ﾠher	 ﾠanxiety	 ﾠabout	 ﾠrations.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefeat,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcities	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠdesperate	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ
food	 ﾠshortages,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠease	 ﾠsubstantially	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠ1949.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠneighborhood	 ﾠ
associations	 ﾠdelivered	 ﾠrationed	 ﾠfood.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠwoman	 ﾠspeaker	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfeared	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
man	 ﾠpressuring	 ﾠher	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠinterfered	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelivery	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrations	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠher	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠdepended.	 ﾠNotably,	 ﾠshe	 ﾠfears	 ﾠa	 ﾠrepresentative	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneighborhood	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠacting	 ﾠon	 ﾠbehalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠshrine,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠpriest.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠany	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective	 ﾠwas	 ﾠissued	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠCommander	 ﾠTakes	 ﾠControl	 ﾠof	 ﾠConstitution	 ﾠDrafting	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ On	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠ1946,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMainichi	 ﾠnewspaper	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdrafting	 ﾠ
work	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMatsumoto	 ﾠcommittee,	 ﾠrevealing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠenvisioned	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠonly	 ﾠcosmetic	 ﾠ
changes	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠconstitution.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠMatsumoto’s	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠwas	 ﾠconfined	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
existing	 ﾠtext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠconstitution,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcontemplated	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠas	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠchange	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
possible.	 ﾠPopular	 ﾠreaction	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠleaked	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMatsumoto	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
lambasted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpress	 ﾠas	 ﾠlame,	 ﾠwatered-ﾭ‐down,	 ﾠand	 ﾠscarcely	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠany	 ﾠdifference.25	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMatsumoto	 ﾠcommittee	 ﾠplanned	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠfor	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ28	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠ
constitution:	 ﾠ
Every	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠshall	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
restrictions	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpeace	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
law.	 ﾠ
Notation:	 ﾠNo	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠthan	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠsubjects.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠprivileges	 ﾠthat	 ﾠevery	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠhas	 ﾠever	 ﾠhad	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠabolished.26	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠMatsumoto	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠshowed	 ﾠevident	 ﾠintent	 ﾠto	 ﾠpersist	 ﾠin	 ﾠcalling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ
“subjects”	 ﾠof	 ﾠHis	 ﾠMajesty	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠcitizens,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
limitation	 ﾠon	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠby	 ﾠunspecified	 ﾠ“restrictions”	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠas	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
maintain	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠorder.	 ﾠNo	 ﾠmention	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠof	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ	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Moreover,	 ﾠin	 ﾠdenying	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠto	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐citizens,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠabdicated	 ﾠ
responsibility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrights	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠformer	 ﾠcolonial	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmight	 ﾠpress	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrievance,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
well	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐Japanese	 ﾠresiding	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapan.	 ﾠIts	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠabrogating	 ﾠ“special	 ﾠ
privileges”	 ﾠto	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleast	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠbow	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
already	 ﾠin	 ﾠforce.	 ﾠ
MacArthur,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhom,	 ﾠas	 ﾠDower	 ﾠnotes,	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠline	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠCommander	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Supreme	 ﾠBeing	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalways	 ﾠa	 ﾠfine	 ﾠone,”	 ﾠwas	 ﾠunwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠwait	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Matsumoto’s	 ﾠhandiwork.	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠdays	 ﾠlater,	 ﾠMacArthur	 ﾠordered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGovernment	 ﾠSection	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠto	 ﾠconvene	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠto	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠan	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠversion	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠone	 ﾠweek.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠto	 ﾠignore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframework	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“revision”	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠand	 ﾠstart	 ﾠafresh.	 ﾠ
MacArthur	 ﾠcharged	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠcome	 ﾠup	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠclauses	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpreserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠinstitution,	 ﾠrenounce	 ﾠwar,	 ﾠand	 ﾠeliminate	 ﾠ
militarism	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“feudalism.”	 ﾠ
No	 ﾠone	 ﾠcould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsurprised	 ﾠby	 ﾠthis	 ﾠturn	 ﾠof	 ﾠevents	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ24	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ
(16	 ﾠofficers	 ﾠand	 ﾠ8	 ﾠcivilians)	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhastily	 ﾠassembled	 ﾠdrafting	 ﾠgroup,	 ﾠheaded	 ﾠby	 ﾠColonel	 ﾠ
Charles	 ﾠKades.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠfour	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ(including	 ﾠKades)	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠattorneys	 ﾠin	 ﾠcivilian	 ﾠlife,	 ﾠ
none	 ﾠhad	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠin	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠrecalling	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMatsumoto	 ﾠhad	 ﾠ
specialized	 ﾠin	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠordained	 ﾠhead	 ﾠdrafter	 ﾠof	 ﾠrevisions	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Japanese	 ﾠgovernment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠhad	 ﾠlived	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapan:	 ﾠHarry	 ﾠEmerson	 ﾠWildes	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠcivilian	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠprewar	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan)27	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyoungest	 ﾠwoman	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠ(there	 ﾠwere	 ﾠfour	 ﾠ
women	 ﾠin	 ﾠall),	 ﾠBeate	 ﾠSirota	 ﾠ(later,	 ﾠGordon),	 ﾠborn	 ﾠin	 ﾠVienna	 ﾠbut	 ﾠraised	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapan,28	 ﾠfluent	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlanguage,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcharged	 ﾠto	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠaffecting	 ﾠwomen.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠofficer	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠ
responsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdrafting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“civil	 ﾠrights”	 ﾠsection	 ﾠwas	 ﾠLieutenant	 ﾠColonel	 ﾠPieter	 ﾠRoest	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
professor	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠscience).29	 ﾠHe	 ﾠand	 ﾠWildes	 ﾠsigned	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠconveying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠMacArthur	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsection	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠrights;	 ﾠBeate	 ﾠSirota	 ﾠwas	 ﾠalso	 ﾠa	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
section	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsign.30	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠdrafters	 ﾠworked	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠballroom	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDai-ﾭ‐Ichi	 ﾠBuilding	 ﾠin	 ﾠTokyo,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠofficers	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠquartered.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠworked	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠsecrecy,	 ﾠbarring	 ﾠall	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
locking	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpapers	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsafe	 ﾠeach	 ﾠnight.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠclauses	 ﾠon	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠwere	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
February	 ﾠ8,	 ﾠ1946,	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsultations	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsteering	 ﾠcommittee	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠrights	 ﾠ
section.	 ﾠEvidently	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠrights	 ﾠsection	 ﾠhad	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠa	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠ(apparently	 ﾠdestroyed	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmeeting)	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠXIII	 ﾠdealt	 ﾠwith	 ﾠreligion.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecret	 ﾠ“Steering	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠ
Minutes	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ5,	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠ7,	 ﾠ8,	 ﾠ9,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠand	 ﾠ12	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1946”	 ﾠare	 ﾠour	 ﾠsole	 ﾠrecord	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpostwar	 ﾠ
constitution’s	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ20	 ﾠwas	 ﾠborn:31	 ﾠ
7.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠoriginally	 ﾠwritten	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠXIII	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠguaranteed	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠexpressedly	 ﾠ[sic.]	 ﾠforbid	 ﾠall	 ﾠecclesiastics	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠkind.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Steering	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠquestioned	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwisdom	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpracticality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠ
provision.	 ﾠColonel	 ﾠKades	 ﾠobjected	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdenial	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠto	 ﾠecclesiastics	 ﾠ
involved	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdenial	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem	 ﾠof	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠspeech	 ﾠand	 ﾠpress	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠA	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠ
prohibition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠplace	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠConstitution,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠBill	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Rights,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠBill	 ﾠof	 ﾠRestrictions.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Colonel	 ﾠRoest	 ﾠstated	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
spiritual	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠends.	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠpriest-ﾭ‐ridden	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
generations	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtyranny	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠreinforced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠof	 ﾠspiritual	 ﾠ
punishment.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠclear	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
attached	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠecclesiastical	 ﾠorganization.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Commander	 ﾠHussey32	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠare	 ﾠpersuaded	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠaction	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchurch,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠ
conscience,	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcorrected	 ﾠby	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠor	 ﾠstatutory	 ﾠlaw.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“no	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠbody	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠif	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
disguise	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion,	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠstir	 ﾠup	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠantagonism	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠor	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
weaken	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠstrengthen	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠorder	 ﾠand	 ﾠmorality”	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
suppression	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠnew	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠsect	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdisturb	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠorder.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDrafting	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠforbids	 ﾠecclesiastical	 ﾠ
penetration	 ﾠinto	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠbut	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcondones	 ﾠState	 ﾠinterference	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
religion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠwas	 ﾠshortened	 ﾠand	 ﾠamended	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSteering	 ﾠto	 ﾠread	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstraight	 ﾠ
forward	 ﾠ[sic.]	 ﾠguarantee	 ﾠof	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠchurch	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
state.33	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Debate	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠelement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdaily	 ﾠmeetings	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsteering	 ﾠcommittee	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
smaller	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠof	 ﾠdrafters.	 ﾠSometimes,	 ﾠdissenting	 ﾠopinions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠissued	 ﾠby	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreconciled	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsteering	 ﾠcommittee’s	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠRoest	 ﾠapparently	 ﾠwanted	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
keep	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠa	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforbid	 ﾠpriests	 ﾠor	 ﾠclerics	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠoffice,	 ﾠKades	 ﾠsaw	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠharm	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviolation	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrights	 ﾠto	 ﾠfree	 ﾠspeech	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠresult	 ﾠand	 ﾠwanted	 ﾠto	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠprohibitions.	 ﾠHussey	 ﾠsaw	 ﾠa	 ﾠdanger	 ﾠin	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate—
in	 ﾠeffect—to	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠby	 ﾠwithholding	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠany	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdeem	 ﾠharmful	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠorder.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthese	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsteering	 ﾠcommittee	 ﾠheld	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠ
views	 ﾠand	 ﾠtended	 ﾠto	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠunrestricted	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠliberties	 ﾠmore	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠthan	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠorder.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠtext	 ﾠof	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ20	 ﾠas	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠparliament	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
essentially	 ﾠunchanged	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcompiled	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠdrafters.	 ﾠ
Diet	 ﾠDiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDraft	 ﾠConstitution	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠdelivered	 ﾠits	 ﾠEnglish-ﾭ‐language	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresentatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Japanese	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠon	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ13,	 ﾠ1946.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠDower	 ﾠterms	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“translation	 ﾠ
marathon,”	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠversion	 ﾠwas	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠproduced—not	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠ
introducing	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠsubtle	 ﾠbut	 ﾠconsequential	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠof	 ﾠnuance	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠ
original—deliberations	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDiet	 ﾠon	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ21,	 ﾠ1946.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠthat	 ﾠSCAP’s	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠkept	 ﾠabsolutely	 ﾠsecret.	 ﾠSCAP	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠabbreviation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠCommander	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 21	 ﾠ
Allied	 ﾠPowers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole.	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠ
began	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetail,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠSCAP’s	 ﾠrole	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠan	 ﾠopen	 ﾠsecret.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠDiet	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSCAP	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠas	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠwere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠgovernment,	 ﾠ
eventually	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠit	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠchanges—all	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠapproved	 ﾠin	 ﾠsecret	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
SCAP,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠreligion.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠwas	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠand	 ﾠformally	 ﾠ
promulgated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠon	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwent	 ﾠinto	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠ
1947.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterval	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠdrafting	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformal	 ﾠadoption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
constitution,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDiet	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdetail,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdealing	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠsovereignty,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor,	 ﾠwar	 ﾠrenunciation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnew	 ﾠrights	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠwoman	 ﾠsuffrage.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠsearching	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdigital	 ﾠrecord	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdeliberations,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠlocate	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
single	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ20	 ﾠor	 ﾠ89.	 ﾠI	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegislators	 ﾠeither	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
find	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclauses	 ﾠproblematic	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfound	 ﾠso	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠelse	 ﾠso	 ﾠproblematic	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠ
problems	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfound	 ﾠwith	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠ20	 ﾠand	 ﾠ89	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcrowded	 ﾠout.34	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Status	 ﾠof	 ﾠReligious	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ No	 ﾠissues	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠraised	 ﾠin	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠJapan’s	 ﾠ
constitution.	 ﾠBuddhist	 ﾠsects	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠadherence	 ﾠto	 ﾠprecepts	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsect,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠthese	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠforce,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠknow	 ﾠof	 ﾠno	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠBuddhist	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠsought	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠanalog	 ﾠto	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠ
law,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠhas	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠChristianity	 ﾠor	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan’s	 ﾠnew	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠmovements.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
small	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠmosques	 ﾠand	 ﾠsynagogues	 ﾠexist,	 ﾠIslam	 ﾠand	 ﾠJudaism	 ﾠare	 ﾠpracticed	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠ
exclusively	 ﾠby	 ﾠimmigrants.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 22	 ﾠ
How	 ﾠHas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠConstitution	 ﾠHeld	 ﾠUp?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠconstitutions	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠrevised	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠtimes—dozens	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
times	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠGermany—the	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠpostwar	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnever	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠrevised.	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠwas	 ﾠcompiled	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation,	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
emphasis	 ﾠon	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠrights	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠliberality	 ﾠby	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠ
found	 ﾠwidespread	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠpeople.	 ﾠAlso,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbar	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠis	 ﾠset	 ﾠ
quite	 ﾠhigh,	 ﾠrequiring	 ﾠa	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐thirds	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠhouses	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDiet	 ﾠ(article	 ﾠ96).	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnever	 ﾠactually	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠrevised,	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
permanent	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐Occupation	 ﾠpolitics,	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconservatives	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠto	 ﾠexalt	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠalter	 ﾠor	 ﾠexcise	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ9,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠrenounces	 ﾠwar.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠvigorously	 ﾠresisted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleft.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
mainly	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠup	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ2000.	 ﾠSurvey	 ﾠdata	 ﾠnow	 ﾠshow	 ﾠan	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠeven	 ﾠsplit,	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠand	 ﾠagainst.	 ﾠ	 ﾠReligious	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠfor	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠare	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠrevision,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠAssociation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠShrines	 ﾠfavors	 ﾠrevision.	 ﾠAmong	 ﾠsome	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ9,	 ﾠ
especially,	 ﾠis	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsacred	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnever	 ﾠbe	 ﾠabrogated.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Constitutional	 ﾠRevision	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClauses	 ﾠon	 ﾠReligion	 ﾠ
McArthur	 ﾠnotified	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠin	 ﾠJanuary	 ﾠ1947	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
appropriate	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ‘freely	 ﾠto	 ﾠreconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitution’	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠits	 ﾠpromulgation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠCommander’s	 ﾠstatement	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠreported	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
press,	 ﾠstimulating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompilation	 ﾠof	 ﾠdrafts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠparties	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
variety	 ﾠof	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠgroups.	 ﾠDiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠpresupposed,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
democratic	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpostwar	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠretained,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 23	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠno	 ﾠreturning	 ﾠto	 ﾠanything	 ﾠresembling	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠconstitution.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
draconian,	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐democratic	 ﾠdrafts	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcompiled	 ﾠat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtime.35	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠimpetus	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnational	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠof	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠcame	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠKorean	 ﾠWar	 ﾠin	 ﾠJune	 ﾠ1950.	 ﾠMost	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠcentered	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
war	 ﾠrenunciation.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ1956	 ﾠbibliography	 ﾠof	 ﾠmagazine	 ﾠand	 ﾠjournal	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠ
dealing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNational	 ﾠDiet	 ﾠLibrary	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan,	 ﾠ
containing	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ300	 ﾠentries,	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠgave	 ﾠany	 ﾠindication	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtitles	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
focus	 ﾠon	 ﾠreligion.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠfar	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠwere	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠeither	 ﾠwith	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ9	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠemperor.36	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ1956,	 ﾠPrime	 ﾠMinister	 ﾠHatoyama	 ﾠIchirō	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Constitution	 ﾠ(Kenpō	 ﾠChōsakai).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ1959	 ﾠthis	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠcompiled	 ﾠa	 ﾠvolume	 ﾠof	 ﾠ13	 ﾠdrafts	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
guidelines	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnew	 ﾠconstitutions,	 ﾠsubmitted	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐government	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
individuals.37	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠof	 ﾠentries	 ﾠ(8)	 ﾠlack	 ﾠany	 ﾠcommentary	 ﾠon	 ﾠreligion,	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsatisfied	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1947	 ﾠconstitution’s	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠarea.	 ﾠFour	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfive	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠdrafts	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠa	 ﾠrearrangement	 ﾠof	 ﾠitems	 ﾠalready	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ1947	 ﾠconstitution,	 ﾠusually	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠits	 ﾠwording	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠchange,	 ﾠneither	 ﾠadding	 ﾠnor	 ﾠ
subtracting	 ﾠideas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠthere.	 ﾠOnly	 ﾠone	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠproposes	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠchange. 
Satomi	 ﾠKishio’s	 ﾠ“Dai-ﾭ‐Nihonkoku	 ﾠkenpō	 ﾠan”	 ﾠis	 ﾠby	 ﾠfar	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠelaborate,	 ﾠspreading	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠobservances	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor.	 ﾠSatomi	 ﾠ(1897-ﾭ‐1974)	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠauthor	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfive	 ﾠ
drafts	 ﾠto	 ﾠcome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠbackground.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠson	 ﾠof	 ﾠTanaka	 ﾠChigaku	 ﾠ(1861-ﾭ‐
1939,	 ﾠ田中智学)	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠof	 ﾠ20th	 ﾠcentury	 ﾠNichiren	 ﾠBuddhism,	 ﾠfounder	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 24	 ﾠ
nationalist	 ﾠlay	 ﾠBuddhist	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠKokuchûkai	 ﾠ(founded	 ﾠ1914).	 ﾠHe	 ﾠfounded	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNihon	 ﾠKokutai	 ﾠ
Gakkai	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1936	 ﾠand	 ﾠlater,	 ﾠa	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠKokutai	 ﾠStudies	 ﾠat	 ﾠRitsumeikan	 ﾠUniversity.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠfounded	 ﾠa	 ﾠNichiren	 ﾠlay	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠRisshô	 ﾠKyôdan	 ﾠ(立正教団)	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1956.	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
prolific	 ﾠwriter,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ100	 ﾠbooks,	 ﾠand	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEmperor	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Proletariat	 ﾠ(Tennô	 ﾠto	 ﾠpuroretaria)	 ﾠsold	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠcopies.	 ﾠThrough	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
publications,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠposition,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠleadership	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
1950s,	 ﾠSatomi	 ﾠwas	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠopinion.38	 ﾠ
Satomi’s	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreturned	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprewar	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠprerogative	 ﾠto	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠ
authentic	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ“inauthentic,”	 ﾠ“constructive”	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ“evil”	 ﾠreligions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuperstition	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
genuine	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠother	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠshould	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuppress	 ﾠ
negative	 ﾠelements	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
stated	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“transcend”	 ﾠ(chōetsu)	 ﾠreligion,	 ﾠan	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠresembling	 ﾠin	 ﾠtone	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMeiji	 ﾠ
constitution’s	 ﾠpositioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“sacred	 ﾠand	 ﾠinviolable.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Satomi	 ﾠdistinguishes	 ﾠ“ancient	 ﾠrites	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate”	 ﾠ(kuni	 ﾠno	 ﾠkōgi	 ﾠ国の	 ﾠ古儀)	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠreligion.	 ﾠ
Thus,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠreverts	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠritual	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsome)	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠrites	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
considered	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature.	 ﾠUnlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprewar	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtended	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠ
civic	 ﾠobservance	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠrites	 ﾠby	 ﾠcoercive	 ﾠmeans,	 ﾠSatomi	 ﾠholds	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠ21	 ﾠand	 ﾠ22	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
shrines	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcompel	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrites.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠsingles	 ﾠout	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠenthronement	 ﾠritual	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrites	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIse	 ﾠShrines	 ﾠas	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠauthoritative,	 ﾠand	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠon	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdesignate	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠas	 ﾠcomparably	 ﾠ
authoritative.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠhis	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ47,	 ﾠSatomi	 ﾠupholds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpostwar	 ﾠconstitution’s	 ﾠprohibition	 ﾠon	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠ
acts	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠexception	 ﾠof	 ﾠnational	 ﾠfunerals	 ﾠor	 ﾠmemorials.	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Presumably	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmemorial	 ﾠrites	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwould	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeaths	 ﾠof	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
former	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠand	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠhousehold,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
completely	 ﾠclarified.	 ﾠHis	 ﾠinsistence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠmemorial	 ﾠrites	 ﾠincorporate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠmemorialized	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdescendants)	 ﾠis	 ﾠquite	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontrasts	 ﾠ
strikingly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠYasukuni	 ﾠShrine	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠNation-ﾭ‐Protecting	 ﾠ
Shrines	 ﾠ(gokoku	 ﾠjinja).	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ48	 ﾠSatomi	 ﾠmandates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠto	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠ
religious	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompulsory	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠnurture	 ﾠ
respect	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreligion,	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠseen	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpostwar	 ﾠ
constitution.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠwith	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother,	 ﾠinasmuch	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconstrued	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“religious	 ﾠact”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
prohibited	 ﾠunder	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ47	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmandated	 ﾠunder	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ48.	 ﾠSatomi	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠadvocate	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
unconditional	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠ(article	 ﾠ46),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontradiction	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthat	 ﾠposition	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠto	 ﾠempower	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠqualifies	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠ“genuine”	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuppress	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠdeviating	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐approved	 ﾠguidelines	 ﾠ
(article	 ﾠ20).	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhappen	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelievers	 ﾠin	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠdeemed	 ﾠ
“superstitious”	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate?	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠSatomi	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠstands	 ﾠout	 ﾠas	 ﾠcontaining	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠproposals,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspirit	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠritual	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
rites	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠelevated	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprewar	 ﾠelement	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcoercion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠfreedom.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠdrafts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠrevised	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠissued	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ1949	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1958	 ﾠcoincided	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠso-ﾭ‐called	 ﾠ“rush	 ﾠhour	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgods,”	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 26	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were	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠfounded	 ﾠor	 ﾠrevived	 ﾠafter	 ﾠstate	 ﾠsuppression	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar’s	 ﾠend.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
years	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmany	 ﾠincidents	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠnew	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠaccused	 ﾠor	 ﾠconvicted	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
serious	 ﾠcrimes.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠSCAP	 ﾠraided	 ﾠthe	 ﾠheadquarters	 ﾠof	 ﾠReiyūkai	 ﾠKyōdan	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1949	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
suspicion	 ﾠof	 ﾠpossession	 ﾠof	 ﾠcocaine	 ﾠand	 ﾠgold	 ﾠbullion.39	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Also,	 ﾠnumerous	 ﾠnew	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠentering	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠ
gain	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠoffice,	 ﾠculminating	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1964	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠof	 ﾠKōmeitō,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠparty	 ﾠ
sponsored	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBuddhist	 ﾠnew	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠSōka	 ﾠGakkai.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠand	 ﾠmembership	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠat	 ﾠunprecedented	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠwell	 ﾠhave	 ﾠstimulated	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠstate	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion,	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdrafts	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠare	 ﾠdevoid	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠproposals.	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠremarkable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠtolerant	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠreligion.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Contemporary	 ﾠReligious	 ﾠGroups’	 ﾠOpposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠConstitutional	 ﾠRevision	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLiberal	 ﾠDemocratic	 ﾠParty	 ﾠ(LDP)	 ﾠpromulgated	 ﾠits	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠrevised	 ﾠ
constitution,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠweakening	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ9.	 ﾠSignificant	 ﾠ
changes	 ﾠto	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ9	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcontravene	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠpacifism	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠby	 ﾠvirtually	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
Japanese	 ﾠreligions.	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ9	 ﾠis	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠby	 ﾠnew	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠand	 ﾠChristianity,	 ﾠ
especially,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠBuddhist	 ﾠcircles	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsacred,	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠof	 ﾠfaith,	 ﾠand	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
move	 ﾠto	 ﾠrevise	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠform	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠevil	 ﾠassault	 ﾠupon	 ﾠall	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠof	 ﾠconscience.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠproclamation	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChristian	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠMukyōkai,	 ﾠfounded	 ﾠby	 ﾠUchimura	 ﾠKanzō,	 ﾠ
“The	 ﾠGospel	 ﾠof	 ﾠJesus	 ﾠChrist	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPeace	 ﾠConstitution,”	 ﾠillustrates	 ﾠthis	 ﾠattitude.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
document	 ﾠasserts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitution	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠprecious	 ﾠjewel	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠGod	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠhumanity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠof	 ﾠJesus	 ﾠto	 ﾠuphold	 ﾠit.40	 ﾠ	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The	 ﾠLDP	 ﾠproposes	 ﾠa	 ﾠloosening	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwording	 ﾠof	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ20,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrites	 ﾠand	 ﾠrituals	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠmight	 ﾠderive	 ﾠhistorically	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠBuddhism	 ﾠor	 ﾠShinto,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠcustomary	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthus	 ﾠlost	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠsignificance,	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprohibited	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠperformed	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinanced	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠfunds.41	 ﾠThe	 ﾠintention	 ﾠpresumably	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeclare	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠ
breaking	 ﾠceremonies	 ﾠand	 ﾠmemorial	 ﾠceremonies	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠperformed	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠcities	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
towns	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmayor	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠelected	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠparticipating.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠrelaxation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠclause	 ﾠimplicitly	 ﾠraises	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠYasukuni	 ﾠShrine,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠexplicitly	 ﾠsingled	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLDP’s	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠthus	 ﾠfar.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Since	 ﾠ1945,	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠresisted	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
weaken	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrict	 ﾠreading	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠclause.	 ﾠNumerous	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠ
today	 ﾠwere	 ﾠprosecuted	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠ1945	 ﾠon	 ﾠcharges	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdoctrines	 ﾠor	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠconstituted	 ﾠ
lèse	 ﾠmajesté	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠinsulting	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠShinto.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
organizations,	 ﾠespecially,	 ﾠreassertions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠritual	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpart	 ﾠto	 ﾠplay	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
democratic	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠobjectionable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLDP’s	 ﾠrevision,	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠceremonial	 ﾠat	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠ(kyūchū	 ﾠsaishi)	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
designated	 ﾠ“public”	 ﾠin	 ﾠcharacter,	 ﾠpaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠfor	 ﾠunderwriting	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠlarge-ﾭ‐scale	 ﾠrituals	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠenthronement	 ﾠrites	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtax	 ﾠrevenues.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠrites	 ﾠat	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠare	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠ
specified,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnew	 ﾠwording	 ﾠraises	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠany	 ﾠother	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
emperor	 ﾠperformed	 ﾠ“public”	 ﾠrites	 ﾠcould	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“public”	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠ“national	 ﾠ
history	 ﾠand	 ﾠtradition”	 ﾠset	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannotation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdoor	 ﾠis	 ﾠopen	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
renewed	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeclare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠYasukuni	 ﾠShrine	 ﾠa	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠfund	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ20-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠ
rebuilding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIse	 ﾠShrines,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsome	 ﾠtraditionalists	 ﾠhope.42	 ﾠ	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Although	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠpredict	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠextent	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠworld	 ﾠwill	 ﾠreact	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠrevision,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspectrum	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠ
incorporates	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠdiversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠissues.	 ﾠAlso	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠhistories	 ﾠand	 ﾠstyles	 ﾠof	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠin	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠits	 ﾠdebates.	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠhas	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠadvocated	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠrevision,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
expect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠwelcome	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLDP’s	 ﾠproposals,	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠadvocating	 ﾠeven	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthorough-ﾭ‐
going	 ﾠchanges.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAssociation	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠShrines	 ﾠwill	 ﾠundoubtedly	 ﾠwelcome	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠchange	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠenable	 ﾠthe	 ﾠYasukuni	 ﾠShrine	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠan	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
nation’s	 ﾠpremier	 ﾠfacility	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhonoring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠdead.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠChristianity	 ﾠ(both	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠchurches,	 ﾠdenominations,	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠChristians,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
several	 ﾠnewspapers	 ﾠpublished	 ﾠunder	 ﾠChristian	 ﾠauspices),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠnew	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠ
movements	 ﾠbelonging	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAssociation	 ﾠof	 ﾠNew	 ﾠReligions	 ﾠ(Shinshūren)	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠ
oppose	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠpacifism	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
strict	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠYet	 ﾠeven	 ﾠamong	 ﾠShinshūren-ﾭ‐affiliated	 ﾠnew	 ﾠreligions,	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠare	 ﾠsome	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwish	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠpacifism	 ﾠstrictly	 ﾠupheld	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwould	 ﾠyet	 ﾠwelcome	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
change	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemperor’s	 ﾠposition.	 ﾠNew	 ﾠAge	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠand	 ﾠnew	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠtending	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
withdraw	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠmay	 ﾠfind	 ﾠit	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠenter	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠdiscourse	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠissues,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠremain	 ﾠcredible	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfollowers	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
adopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠkind.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠunified	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBuddhist	 ﾠsects	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠprecedents,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠprobably	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠan	 ﾠostrich	 ﾠapproach.	 ﾠ
Nevertheless,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠassociations	 ﾠof	 ﾠBuddhist	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnewspapers	 ﾠthey	 ﾠpublish	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠa	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠposition.	 ﾠRecent	 ﾠtrends	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠBuddhist	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ
engagement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠin	 ﾠBuddhist	 ﾠNGOs,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐
sectarian,	 ﾠand	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcooperated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠChristians	 ﾠto	 ﾠoppose	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠ
States’	 ﾠwars	 ﾠin	 ﾠAfghanistan	 ﾠand	 ﾠIraq.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠLDP’s	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠConstitutional	 ﾠDraft	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠApril	 ﾠ2012	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLDP	 ﾠissued	 ﾠa	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠrevised	 ﾠconstitution,	 ﾠto	 ﾠcoincide	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsixtieth	 ﾠanniversary	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSan	 ﾠFrancisco	 ﾠPeace	 ﾠTreaty.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠproposes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠ
wording	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnew	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠ20	 ﾠand	 ﾠ89	 ﾠ(italicized	 ﾠportions	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwording	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpostwar	 ﾠconstitution):	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ20:	 ﾠReligious	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠis	 ﾠguaranteed.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠ
privileges	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠorganization.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠNo person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite, or 
practice.  
3. The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious 
activity. However, those observances not transcending the boundaries of social 
ceremonies or customary actions are not to be restricted under this provision. 
 
Article	 ﾠ89:	 ﾠNo	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠshall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpended	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse,	 ﾠbenefit,	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠmaintenance	 ﾠof	 ﾠany	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠor	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠconducting	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠactivities,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
exception	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠclause	 ﾠ3	 ﾠof	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ20.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
  On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurface,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠwording	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdraft	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠincorporates	 ﾠpostwar	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠ
Court	 ﾠinterpretations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠ
rulings	 ﾠstemmed	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠ1965	 ﾠcase:	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠof	 ﾠTsu	 ﾠ(Mie	 ﾠPrefecture)	 ﾠheld	 ﾠa	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠ
ceremony	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠa	 ﾠjichinsai	 ﾠ(grounds	 ﾠpurification	 ﾠceremony)	 ﾠto	 ﾠinaugurate	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠcity	 ﾠgymnasium,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity	 ﾠcouncil	 ﾠraised	 ﾠa	 ﾠlawsuit,	 ﾠclaiming	 ﾠviolation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
articles	 ﾠ20	 ﾠand	 ﾠ89.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdistrict	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠfound	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠplaintiff,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappeals	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠreversed	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠverdict,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠCourt.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcourt’s	 ﾠ1977	 ﾠruling,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandard,	 ﾠruled	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠseparation	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠstate	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠ“whose	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠcarries	 ﾠa	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠmeaning,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport,	 ﾠ
encourage,	 ﾠencourage,	 ﾠor	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠreligion,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠoppress	 ﾠor	 ﾠinterfere	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit”	 ﾠis	 ﾠprohibited.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠis	 ﾠreferred	 ﾠto	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“purpose	 ﾠand	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠstandard”	 ﾠ(mokuteki-ﾭ‐
kōka	 ﾠkijun).	 ﾠBy	 ﾠthis	 ﾠunderstanding,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexist	 ﾠ“ceremonies”	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ“religious,”	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrituals	 ﾠlike	 ﾠjichinsai	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ“customary”	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature,	 ﾠweakening	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠmeaning.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠTsu	 ﾠcase	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠand	 ﾠcustomary	 ﾠ
ceremonies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠallows	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠto	 ﾠconduct	 ﾠrites	 ﾠperformed	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠpriests.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠis	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠin	 ﾠopening	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpostwar	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
ceremonies	 ﾠderiving	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠrekindling	 ﾠideas	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
Japanese,	 ﾠregardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ(other)	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠterms,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLDP’s	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠrevisions	 ﾠto	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠ20	 ﾠand	 ﾠ89	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcoded	 ﾠmessage	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠmost	 ﾠtraditionalist	 ﾠ
supporters,	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparty’s	 ﾠwillingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrestored	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠYasukuni	 ﾠShrine.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠvoters	 ﾠreturned	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLDP	 ﾠto	 ﾠpower	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠlandslide	 ﾠvictory	 ﾠin	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ2012.	 ﾠ
Prime	 ﾠMinister	 ﾠAbe	 ﾠShinzō,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠserved	 ﾠas	 ﾠprime	 ﾠminister	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ9.26.2007	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
2.26.2007,	 ﾠworked	 ﾠtirelessly	 ﾠduring	 ﾠhis	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠterm	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠrevision.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠ
succeeded	 ﾠin	 ﾠpassing	 ﾠa	 ﾠbill	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠa	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠreferendum	 ﾠon	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠ
revision,	 ﾠand	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠwas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐election	 ﾠplatform	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2012.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
stated	 ﾠintention	 ﾠto	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠduring	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠterm	 ﾠin	 ﾠoffice.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 31	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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1	 ﾠThe	 ﾠguide	 ﾠto	 ﾠHoltom’s	 ﾠpapers	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠClaremont	 ﾠCollege	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠbiographical	 ﾠinformation:	 ﾠ
“Daniel	 ﾠClarence	 ﾠHoltom	 ﾠwas	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠto	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapan.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠborn	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Michigan	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1884,	 ﾠearned	 ﾠdegrees	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠKalamazoo	 ﾠCollege,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠChicago,	 ﾠand	 ﾠNewton	 ﾠ
Theological	 ﾠSeminary.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠordained	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBaptist	 ﾠministry	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1910	 ﾠand	 ﾠwent	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠto	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
missionary.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠprofessor	 ﾠof	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠlanguages	 ﾠat	 ﾠTokyo	 ﾠGakuin,	 ﾠprofessor	 ﾠof	 ﾠchurch	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠTokyo	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠTheological	 ﾠSeminary,	 ﾠand	 ﾠprofessor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠand	 ﾠchurch	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Kanto	 ﾠGakuin	 ﾠof	 ﾠYokohama.	 ﾠDr.	 ﾠHoltom	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdean	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheology	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAoyama	 ﾠGakuin	 ﾠof	 ﾠTokyo	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1936-ﾭ‐
1940.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠreturned	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwas	 ﾠHaskell	 ﾠLecturer	 ﾠat	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠChicago	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ
lectured	 ﾠat	 ﾠColgate-ﾭ‐Rochester	 ﾠDivinity	 ﾠSchool	 ﾠand	 ﾠtaught	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠat	 ﾠRedlands	 ﾠUniversity.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠdied	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ1962	 ﾠin	 ﾠSan	 ﾠGabriel,	 ﾠCalifornia.”	 ﾠSee	 ﾠhttp://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt1s2023xp/.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠof	 ﾠChicago	 ﾠPress.	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠIts	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠdrafting	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠwere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠrelations	 ﾠ
specialist	 ﾠGeorge	 ﾠH.	 ﾠBlakesley	 ﾠand	 ﾠhistorian	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠat	 ﾠColumbia	 ﾠUniversity,	 ﾠHugh	 ﾠBorton.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠShintō	 ﾠno	 ﾠtokken	 ﾠhaishi,	 ﾠare	 ﾠkara	 ﾠ15	 ﾠnen.	 ﾠAsahi	 ﾠshinbun	 ﾠ1959.8.2,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠhad	 ﾠa	 ﾠPh.D.	 ﾠin	 ﾠhistory,	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠan	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠteacher	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠschool	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1936	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1939,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠmarried	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠwoman	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠparents	 ﾠwere	 ﾠProtestant	 ﾠmissionaries.	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠWoodward	 ﾠhad	 ﾠadvanced	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠin	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠTheological	 ﾠSeminary	 ﾠand	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠmissionary	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCongregational	 ﾠChristian	 ﾠChurches	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1921	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1941.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠMark	 ﾠMullins.	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠHow	 ﾠYasukuni	 ﾠ
Shrine	 ﾠSurvived	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOccupation:	 ﾠA	 ﾠCritical	 ﾠExamination	 ﾠof	 ﾠPopular	 ﾠClaims.	 ﾠMonumenta	 ﾠNipponica	 ﾠ65/1:	 ﾠ108-ﾭ‐
110.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠKonoe	 ﾠFumimaro	 ﾠ(1891-ﾭ‐1945)	 ﾠhad	 ﾠserved	 ﾠthree	 ﾠtimes	 ﾠas	 ﾠprime	 ﾠminister	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurrender,	 ﾠhelping	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
form	 ﾠJapan’s	 ﾠalliance	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAxis	 ﾠpowers.	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠIt	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠthe	 ﾠYasukuni,	 ﾠMeiji,	 ﾠNogi,	 ﾠTōgō,	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠas	 ﾠcenters	 ﾠof	 ﾠnationalism	 ﾠand	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
shrines	 ﾠmight	 ﾠpossibly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclosed	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠviolating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠfreedom,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠJapanese	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠhad	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠthe	 ﾠline	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreligious.	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠMullins	 ﾠ2010:	 ﾠ103.	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠIt	 ﾠseems	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠalso	 ﾠread	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnglish	 ﾠworks	 ﾠof	 ﾠKatō	 ﾠGenchi	 ﾠand	 ﾠKōno	 ﾠSeizō	 ﾠon	 ﾠmikadoism	 ﾠ
published	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnglish-ﾭ‐language	 ﾠjournal	 ﾠat	 ﾠSophia	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠin	 ﾠTokyo,	 ﾠMonumenta	 ﾠNipponica.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠ
numerous	 ﾠoccasions	 ﾠhe	 ﾠconsulted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠscholar	 ﾠof	 ﾠZen	 ﾠBuddhism,	 ﾠD.T.	 ﾠSuzuki	 ﾠand	 ﾠMiyaji	 ﾠNaokazu,	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Jingiin	 ﾠand	 ﾠChair	 ﾠfor	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠStudies	 ﾠat	 ﾠTokyo	 ﾠImperial	 ﾠUniversity.	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠMullins	 ﾠ2010:	 ﾠ111-ﾭ‐118.	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠMullins	 ﾠ2010:	 ﾠ113.	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠMullins	 ﾠ2010:	 ﾠ114-ﾭ‐116.	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠWoodward,	 ﾠ1972,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ69.	 ﾠ
15	 ﾠTakashima	 ﾠBeihō,	 ﾠ“Jinja	 ﾠwa	 ﾠshūkyō	 ﾠni	 ﾠarazu”	 ﾠAsahi	 ﾠshinbun	 ﾠNov.	 ﾠ12,	 ﾠ1945,	 ﾠp.2.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠis	 ﾠtranslated	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Creemers,	 ﾠWilhemus.	 ﾠ1968.	 ﾠShrine	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠII.	 ﾠLeiden:	 ﾠE.J.	 ﾠBrill,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ51-ﾭ‐52.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠauthor	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
piece	 ﾠis	 ﾠmisidentified	 ﾠin	 ﾠCreemers’	 ﾠwork	 ﾠas	 ﾠTakashima	 ﾠYoshimine.	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠas	 ﾠreprinted	 ﾠin	 ﾠWoodward,	 ﾠ1972,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ322-ﾭ‐341.	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠIbid.,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ324.	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreport	 ﾠintroduces	 ﾠdistinctions	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ“State	 ﾠShinto”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“Sect	 ﾠShinto.”	 ﾠWithout	 ﾠformally	 ﾠdefining	 ﾠ
“State	 ﾠShinto,”	 ﾠBunce	 ﾠseemed	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠto	 ﾠdesignate	 ﾠall	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsects.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠall	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠ
purposes,	 ﾠState	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠand	 ﾠShrine	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠwere	 ﾠinterchangeable	 ﾠterms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠDirective.	 ﾠ
19	 ﾠWoodward,	 ﾠ1972:	 ﾠ298.	 ﾠ
20	 ﾠWoodward,	 ﾠ1972,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ69.	 ﾠ
21	 ﾠWoodward,	 ﾠ1972:	 ﾠ69-ﾭ‐72;	 ﾠ106-ﾭ‐109.	 ﾠ
22	 ﾠShinto	 ﾠto	 ﾠtennōsei.	 ﾠYomiuri	 ﾠshinbun	 ﾠ18	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1945,	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 ﾠ(6	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 ﾠ1318).	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 ﾠQuoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠWoodward,	 ﾠ1972,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ128.	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 ﾠDower,	 ﾠJohn.	 ﾠ1999.	 ﾠEmbracing	 ﾠDefeat:	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWake	 ﾠof	 ﾠWorld	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pp.	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26	 ﾠCharles	 ﾠL.	 ﾠKades	 ﾠPapers	 ﾠ[microform]	 ﾠ[between	 ﾠ1946	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1948]	 ﾠHarvard	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠLibraries,	 ﾠFilm	 ﾠ
W23975.	 ﾠ
27	 ﾠHarry	 ﾠEmerson	 ﾠWildes	 ﾠ(1890-ﾭ‐1982),	 ﾠclergyman,	 ﾠsociologist,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbiographer	 ﾠof	 ﾠGeorge	 ﾠFox	 ﾠand	 ﾠWilliam	 ﾠ
Penn,	 ﾠtook	 ﾠhis	 ﾠundergraduate	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠat	 ﾠHarvard	 ﾠUniversity,	 ﾠgraduating	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1920s,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠPh.D.	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 32	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
University	 ﾠof	 ﾠPennsylvania	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1927,	 ﾠworking	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠtime	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠjournalist.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠresigned	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Occupation	 ﾠin	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1946,	 ﾠdisillusioned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠarrogance.	 ﾠHe	 ﾠwent	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠwrite	 ﾠTyphoon	 ﾠOver	 ﾠTokyo:	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠand	 ﾠIts	 ﾠAftermath	 ﾠ(New	 ﾠYork:	 ﾠMacmillan,	 ﾠ1954).	 ﾠ
28	 ﾠSirota’s	 ﾠfather	 ﾠhad	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠorchestra	 ﾠconductor	 ﾠand	 ﾠremained	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠteacher	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
music.	 ﾠ
29	 ﾠRoest	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠDutch	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠeducated	 ﾠin	 ﾠHolland;	 ﾠTadashi	 ﾠAruga.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠDeclaration	 ﾠof	 ﾠIndependence	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠJapan:	 ﾠTranslation	 ﾠand	 ﾠTransplantation,	 ﾠ1854-ﾭ‐1997”	 ﾠ
http://chnm.gmu.edu/declaration/japanese/aruga2.html,	 ﾠaccessed	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ19,	 ﾠ2012.	 ﾠ
30	 ﾠDower,	 ﾠ1999,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ364-ﾭ‐365.	 ﾠ
31	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠno	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠarticle	 ﾠ89.	 ﾠ
32	 ﾠAlfred	 ﾠR.	 ﾠHussey,	 ﾠJr.,	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlawyers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgroup.	 ﾠ
33	 ﾠ“Steering	 ﾠCommittee	 ﾠMinutes	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ5,	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠ7,	 ﾠ8,	 ﾠ9,	 ﾠ11	 ﾠand	 ﾠ12	 ﾠFebruary	 ﾠ1946,”	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ14-ﾭ‐15,	 ﾠCharles	 ﾠL.	 ﾠKades	 ﾠPapers	 ﾠ
[microform]	 ﾠ[between	 ﾠ1946	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1948]	 ﾠHarvard	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠLibraries,	 ﾠFilm	 ﾠW23975.	 ﾠ
34	 ﾠThis	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠseems	 ﾠvery	 ﾠodd	 ﾠto	 ﾠme;	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠdevise	 ﾠother	 ﾠsearch	 ﾠtechniques	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠturn	 ﾠup	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstage	 ﾠof	 ﾠresearch,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠany.	 ﾠ
35	 ﾠTanaka	 ﾠNobuyoshi.	 ﾠ2005.	 ﾠKenpō	 ﾠkyūjō	 ﾠno	 ﾠsengoshi.	 ﾠTokyo:	 ﾠIwanami	 ﾠshinsho	 ﾠ951,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ11-ﾭ‐13,	 ﾠ48-ﾭ‐53.	 ﾠ
36	 ﾠChōsa	 ﾠrippō	 ﾠkōsa	 ﾠkyoku,	 ﾠHōritsu	 ﾠseiji	 ﾠtoshokan	 ﾠdai-ﾭ‐ni	 ﾠka..	 ﾠ1956.	 ﾠNihon	 ﾠkoku	 ﾠkenpō	 ﾠseitei	 ﾠkeika	 ﾠnichiroku	 ﾠ
(miteikō	 ﾠno	 ﾠsan).	 ﾠTokyo:	 ﾠNational	 ﾠDiet	 ﾠLibrary	 ﾠof	 ﾠJapan.	 ﾠ
37	 ﾠKenpō	 ﾠChōsakai	 ﾠJimukyoku,	 ﾠed.	 ﾠ1959.	 ﾠNihonkoku	 ﾠkenpō	 ﾠkaisei	 ﾠshōan	 ﾠ(Tokyo).	 ﾠ
38	 ﾠHere	 ﾠare	 ﾠhis	 ﾠproposals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreligion:	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ20:	 ﾠProtection	 ﾠof	 ﾠReligion,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEmperor’s	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠState’s	 ﾠTranscendence	 ﾠof	 ﾠSect,	 ﾠProhibition	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠAuthoritarian	 ﾠInterference	 ﾠ
Recognizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspiritual	 ﾠlife	 ﾠof	 ﾠhumanity,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠshall	 ﾠ
protect	 ﾠall	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠsects	 ﾠpossessing	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠequally.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠemperor	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠtranscend	 ﾠall	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠsects	 ﾠand	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgive	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠprotection	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠany	 ﾠsect	 ﾠor	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠorganization.	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinterfere	 ﾠwith	 ﾠany	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠsect	 ﾠor	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠorganization,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwith	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
believer,	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠdoctrine,	 ﾠceremony	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠassembly	 ﾠor	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠcontravene	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconstitution.	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠmay	 ﾠsuppress	 ﾠsuperstition,	 ﾠheterodox	 ﾠplaces	 ﾠof	 ﾠworship,	 ﾠand	 ﾠevil	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠprescribed	 ﾠby	 ﾠlaw.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ21	 ﾠAncient	 ﾠState	 ﾠRites	 ﾠ
Imperial	 ﾠenthronement	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠDaijō-ﾭ‐e)	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠrites	 ﾠtransmitted	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimperial	 ﾠ
household	 ﾠare	 ﾠancient	 ﾠstate	 ﾠrites	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdistinguished	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsectarian	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ22	 ﾠThe	 ﾠIse	 ﾠGrand	 ﾠShrine	 ﾠand	 ﾠShrines	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠIse	 ﾠGrand	 ﾠShrine	 ﾠand	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠso	 ﾠdesignated	 ﾠin	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠare	 ﾠfacilities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
ancient	 ﾠstate	 ﾠrites.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaccord	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠarticle,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGrand	 ﾠShrine	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠshrines	 ﾠplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
naturally	 ﾠharmonizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople,	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfreely	 ﾠaccorded	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠand	 ﾠreverence.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
shrines	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpreach	 ﾠor	 ﾠcoerce	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠdoctrines	 ﾠnor	 ﾠcriticize	 ﾠor	 ﾠslander	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rituals,	 ﾠdoctrines,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠreligions.	 ﾠEach	 ﾠshrine	 ﾠrite	 ﾠbased	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshrine’s	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠtraditions	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
recognized	 ﾠas	 ﾠpreserving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspirit	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠancient	 ﾠcustoms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople.	 ﾠDetails	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGrand	 ﾠShrine	 ﾠand	 ﾠShrines	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠenacted	 ﾠas	 ﾠlaw).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ46	 ﾠFreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠReligious	 ﾠFaith	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠare	 ﾠno	 ﾠlimitations	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠto	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠ
faith,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠa	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠsect	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠpersons	 ﾠare	 ﾠfree	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠceremonies,	 ﾠrites,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
observances;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmatters.	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠNo	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠsect	 ﾠor	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠmay	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠprivilege.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 33	 ﾠ
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Article	 ﾠ47	 ﾠProhibition	 ﾠon	 ﾠReligious	 ﾠActivity	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠState	 ﾠand	 ﾠExceptions	 ﾠ
Neither	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠits	 ﾠorgans,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠany	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠmay	 ﾠperform	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠkind,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexceptions	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠarticle.	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠNational	 ﾠfunerals,	 ﾠfuneral	 ﾠand	 ﾠmemorial	 ﾠrites	 ﾠsponsored	 ﾠand	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠout	 ﾠby	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
offices	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbased	 ﾠupon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfaith	 ﾠand	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperson(s)	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfuneral	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠbereaved	 ﾠrelatives.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwish	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthese	 ﾠrites	 ﾠperformed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠsect,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
wish	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrespected	 ﾠand	 ﾠincorporated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠceremony.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Article	 ﾠ48	 ﾠReligious	 ﾠEducation	 ﾠConducted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠState	 ﾠ
Throughout	 ﾠcompulsory	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnurture	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠ
among	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠteaching	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconstructive	 ﾠreligions	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrevered.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
39	 ﾠOther	 ﾠevents	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexploited	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
shield	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfounders	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠprosecution,	 ﾠas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfounding	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1950	 ﾠof	 ﾠHigashikuni-ﾭ‐kyô	 ﾠ(ひがしくに教
)	 ﾠby	 ﾠformer	 ﾠPrime	 ﾠMinister	 ﾠHigashikuni	 ﾠNaruhiko,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhad	 ﾠpresided	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsigning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
surrender	 ﾠbut	 ﾠlater	 ﾠresigned	 ﾠin	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠOccupation	 ﾠorders	 ﾠto	 ﾠrescind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPeace	 ﾠPreservation	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
1925	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠdissolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpecial	 ﾠPolice.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnumerous	 ﾠprosecutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtax	 ﾠevasion	 ﾠ
during	 ﾠthese	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
40	 ﾠ“Iesu	 ﾠKirisuto	 ﾠno	 ﾠfukuin	 ﾠto	 ﾠheiwa	 ﾠkenpô”	 ﾠKirisuto	 ﾠshinbun	 ﾠ11.27.2004,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠ
41	 ﾠPrecedents	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠSupreme	 ﾠCourt	 ﾠrulings	 ﾠwould	 ﾠset	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcustomary	 ﾠrites	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
permitted.	 ﾠ
42	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠopens	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠambassadors	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole	 ﾠor	 ﾠmake	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
own	 ﾠobservances	 ﾠat	 ﾠYasukuni. 